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• The outstanding amount of Canadian dollar
government debt declined in absolute terms
during the 1997/98 ﬁscal year, for the ﬁrst
time since 1969/70, as a result of ﬁnancial
surpluses in the past few years.
• In light of this signiﬁcant shift in
the government’s financial position and
the government’s strategic objective with
regard to the market for its securities, the
Bank of Canada and the Department of
Finance have taken measures to ensure a
liquid and well-functioning market for
Government of Canada securities.
• Changes have been made to auction rules,
to the government bond program, and to the
treasury bill program, and the Investment
Dealers Association of Canada has adopted
a code of conduct for the secondary market.
Recent Initiatives in the Canadian
Market for Government of Canada
Securities
ith the decline in the federal govern-
ment’s ﬁnancial requirements, the Bank
of Canada, the Department of Finance,
and ﬁnancial market participants have
begun to examine and put in place various measures
to manage the reduction in public debt, while continu-
ing to enhance the efﬁciency, liquidity, and integrity of
the market for Government of Canada securities. For
the government, maintaining a liquid and well-func-
tioning market is a key element in ensuring stable and
low-cost ﬁnancing.  Thus, its focus is on the liquidity,
transparency, and integrity of the market. For their
part, other participants in the domestic market for
government debt beneﬁt from an efﬁcient and liquid
market, since government issues are used as a bench-
mark in pricing other ﬁxed-income securities.
This article brieﬂy explains the recent changes in the
marketformarketableGovernmentofCanadadebt,in
light of the government’s evolving ﬁnancial position,
and discusses initiatives that the various parties
involved have taken to cope with these changes and to
enhance the market’s efﬁciency and liquidity.
The Financial Position of the
Government of Canada and the
Market for its Securities
The Government of Canada has recorded a ﬁnancial
surplus in each of the last three ﬁscal years. (See box
on page 28 for the relationship between the ﬁnancial
and budgetary balances.) The ﬁnancial balance shifted
from a deﬁcit of $33.8 billion in 1991/92 to a surplus of
$10.8 billion in 1998/99 (Chart 1).1 This ﬁnancial
1.  Department of Finance (1999b). Final data will be available this autumn.
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The budgetary balance and the ﬁnancial balance
are measures of the government’s ﬁnancial situa-
tion—deﬁcit or surplus—during a given ﬁscal
year.
The budgetary balance is expressed largely on an
accrual accounting basis and relates to changes in
government assets and liabilities, regardless of the
timing of cash receipts or outlays.  The ﬁnancial
balance, on the other hand, is expressed in terms of
cash, and represents the difference between cash
receipts and cash outlays for government pro-
grams and public debt charges.  Thus, a deﬁcit in
the ﬁnancial balance means a cash requirement,
and this is funded by market borrowing, while a
surplus ﬁnancial balance means a cash surplus and
could allow a portion of previously acquired debt
to be retired.
To derive the ﬁnancial balance from the budgetary
balance, several adjustments must be made. The
most important one is to add or subtract (as appro-
priate) transactions relating to public sector pen-
sion plans. The net change in government loans,
investments, and advances must also be added to
the budgetary balance, and some of the ﬁgures
used to calculate the budgetary balance on an
accrual basis have to be restated in cash terms. The
table below shows the calculations used to estab-
lish the budgetary and ﬁnancial balances for the
1998/99 ﬁscal year.
Note that a $3 billion contingency reserve is
included in the budget plan. This reserve is
intended primarily to cover the government
against risks arising from (i) inevitable inaccuracies
in the models used to translate economic assump-
tions into detailed budget forecasts, and (ii) unfore-
seen events.  The contingency reserve also offers a
safety cushion in case of forecasting errors. If the
reserve is not needed, the government is commit-


























* Includes the Canada Pension Plan account, retirement pensions, and other
accounts
** Includes reconciliation between cash and accrual bases
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improvement has been due primarily to discretionary
measures taken to reduce and restructure program
spending and to the positive impact of economic
growth on ﬁscal revenues. It should be noted that
because of the high level of interest-bearing debt,
interest on the public debt is still the largest single
item in federal government spending: in 1998/99, it
amounted to nearly $44 billion. Borrowing must there-
fore be managed to ensure that the government
Chart 1
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* These are the subcategories used by the Bank of Canada to classify Government of
Canada debt. They may differ slightly from those in the National Accounts.
has access to a stable source of ﬁnancing at the best
possible price, while protecting it against unexpected
interest rate ﬂuctuations.2
The improvement in the government’s ﬁnancial situa-
tion has meant that, for the ﬁrst time since the 1969/70
ﬁscal year, there has been an absolute drop in the
amount of its outstanding market debt. In June 1999,
this debt amounted to Can$450 billion, while in March
1995 it stood at Can$466 billion. Table 1 shows the out-
standing amount of this debt and of its components.
The composition of the Canadian-dollar-denominated
debt has changed considerably over recent years. The
proportion of marketable bonds increased from 56 per
cent in March 1995 to 73 per cent in June 1999. During
the same period, the proportion of treasury bills
dropped from 37 per cent to 20 per cent. The govern-
ment’s strategy of reducing the sensitivity of the pub-
lic debt to ﬂuctuations in interest rates by increasing
the proportion of ﬁxed-rate securities, together with
lower government ﬁnancing requirements, has led to
a signiﬁcant decline in the amount and proportion of
treasury bills.3
The improvement in the
government’s ﬁnancial situation has
meant that . . . there has been an
absolute drop in the amount of its
outstanding market debt.
As a result of the declining amount of treasury bills,
liquidity indicators for this market have deteriorated
over the last two years, excluding the turbulent period
in the autumn of 1998. Bid-offer spreads have wid-
ened, while the volume of transactions and the aver-
age coverage ratio at auctions have declined (Charts 2,
3, and 4).4 In the bond market, these indicators have
2.  Interest-bearing debt consists of internal debt and market debt. Internal
debt includes federal public sector pension plan liabilities, the government’s
current liabilities, and bonds issued to the Canada Pension Plan. Market debt
consists of Canadian dollar instruments sold on capital markets (in the form
of Government of Canada bonds, treasury bills, and retail non-marketable
debt) and foreign-currency-denominated bonds and bills.
3.  Fixed-rate debt is deﬁned as debt with a remaining term to maturity of
more than one year, or with an interest rate that will not change within the
year. For more information, see Department of Finance (1999a).
4. For more information on the effects of a shrinking supply of treasury bills,
see Boisvert and Harvey (1998).30 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
moved differently. Since the volume of bond transac-
tions depends primarily on the effective supply of
bonds, the introduction of a benchmark bond issue in
1992/93 and the debt-management strategy followed
in recent years by the government have enhanced the
Chart 3
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liquidity of this market and have moderated the impact
of the government’s improving ﬁnancial situation.5
Bid-offer spreads for bonds have widened only
slightly since 1997 (Chart 2). The volume of transac-
tions rose sharply from 1994 to 1997 (Chart 3)
(Gravelle 1999).
Recent Initiatives
The major changes that have affected the amount and
issuance of government securities, together with the
desire to maintain and enhance market liquidity and
efﬁciency, have led to a number of initiatives on the
part of the authorities and market participants. Cases
of “market squeezes”—gaining control of an issue at
the time of auction and subsequently restricting its
supply on the cash and repo markets—aroused con-
cerns about rules and practices in the primary and
secondary markets. If a market is vulnerable to
manipulation, the price-discovery process could be
undermined, destroying public conﬁdence in the efﬁ-
ciency and integrity of the market.
Among the measures taken are changes to the auction
rules for treasury bills and their oversight by the
Bank of Canada, as well as the guidelines adopted by
the Investment Dealers Association of Canada (IDA
Policy No. 5). In addition, the Bank of Canada and the
5.   Effective supply equals the supply offered minus the stock of securities
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federal government have modified the bond program
by creating a pilot bond buyback program and have
adjusted the treasury bill program, in order to main-
tain the supply of benchmark issues.
The auction process: Regulation and
supervision
Since 1996, concern had been growing about the effec-
tiveness of existing auction guidelines, at a time when
the supply of securities was shrinking and the ﬁnan-
cial services sector was becoming larger and more
integrated. There was a potential risk of manipulation
in the system, since participants were in a position to
acquire control of an issue through the when-issued
market and the tendering process, even if such behav-
iour was contrary to the principles underlying the
rules. Moreover, there was no actual limit on the amount
of securities that a single customer could acquire.
In a system operating under the threat of such
squeezes, intermediaries would be reluctant to take
short positions on the when-issued market and to
engage in other market-making activities, or to partic-
ipate in auctions and in the secondary market. Inves-
tors would also face a less-liquid and less-efﬁcient
market, and would be less active at auctions and in
the secondary market. In addition, ﬁnancing costs
could rise for many issuers, including the federal
government and others whose securities are priced
against government benchmark issues.
The Bank and the government were
seeking to ensure that the auction
process is free of, and is seen to be free
of, manipulation.
In December 1996, the Bank of Canada produced
“Discussion Paper 1” drawing attention to these prob-
lems and setting out a number of suggestions for rein-
forcing the integrity of the auction process by
reducing opportunities for manipulation (Bank of
Canada 1996).6 The Bank invited market participants
to submit their views on the proposed rules and sur-
6. In developing these new rules, the Bank of Canada and the Department of
Finance drew upon models used in other countries, particularly the United
States, and adapted them to the speciﬁc features of the Canadian market.
veillance measures. In April 1998, a second document
restated the proposals on the basis of the comments
received (Bank of Canada 1998a). Once again, partici-
pants were invited to comment. In August 1998, the
Bank of Canada published a document entitled
“Revised rules pertaining to Government of Canada
securities and the Bank of Canada’s surveillance of the
auction process” (Bank of Canada 1998b). These new
rules went into effect on 14 October 1998. The inter-
ested reader can ﬁnd this document on the Bank’s
Web site (www.bank-banque-canada.ca).
By taking these steps, the Bank and the government
were seeking to ensure that the auction process is free
of, and is seen to be free of, manipulation. The new
measures should assure participants that investors
and intermediaries will not be able to acquire exces-
sive amounts of Government of Canada securities at
auction. They will also serve to draw the market’s
attention to the fact that the Bank, on behalf of the
government, oversees the various aspects of the auc-
tion process in the public interest. In this way, public
conﬁdence in the auction process can be maintained
and investor and dealer participation enhanced. The
revisions contain a new classiﬁcation of government
securities distributors, a deﬁnition of a bidding entity,
new bidding limits for distributors, and separate bid-
ding limits for their clients. They also require partici-
pants to report certain information to the surveillance
authorities. The following is a very brief summary of
the main components of the new rules.
· New classiﬁcation of entities
The new classiﬁcations for entities eligible
to participate directly in the tender process
reﬂect the changes in their roles in recent
years. Primary distributors are now called
government securities distributors, and a
subgroup of this broad class, those that
maintain a certain level of activity on the
primary and secondary markets, will be
called primary dealers instead of jobbers.
· New deﬁnition of a bidder
The new deﬁnition of a bidder restricts the
ability of afﬁliated entities to bid in concert
in order to manipulate the auction process.
· Bidding limits for distributors and
clients
Under the new rules, bidding limits for
government securities distributors apply32 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
only to bids on their own behalf.
Customers bid separately through
distributors and under their own bidding
limits. The main reason for introducing
these separate bidding limits is the need to
reduce the risk of abuse of the bidding
processbythoseseekingtosqueezecertain
issues. The new limits also take account of
each bidder’s net position in the when-
issued market and its holdings, if any, of
outstanding amounts of the particular
security.
· Reporting requirements
Under the new reporting rules, all
participantswishingtobidatauctionmust
report to the Bank of Canada their
positions in the when-issued market and
in outstanding securities, so that the Bank
can adjust the participants’ bidding limits
for these holdings.
IDA Policy No. 5
In September 1998, the Investment Dealers Associa-
tion of Canada, in consultation with the Bank of Can-
ada and the Department of Finance, adopted a set of
guidelines to promote public conﬁdence in the integ-
rity of Canadian debt securities markets and to
enhance liquidity, efﬁciency, and the maintenance of
active trading and lending in those markets. Since the
government is responsible for the integrity of only the
primary market for Government of Canada securities,
the IDA was responsible for developing a code of con-
duct for the secondary market.
Policy No. 5 describes standards and procedures for
transactions in the domestic debt market.7 The policy
is intended to supplement laws, government regula-
tions, rules, and codes of conduct for exchanges and
self-regulatory organizations. In the event of any
inconsistency between the terms of the policy and any
other rules of the association, the new guidelines will
prevail. The policy applies to members of the associa-
tion and to all related companies of members or their
7.   By “domestic debt market,” the IDA means “an over-the-counter,
wholesale debt market in which Members participate as dealers on
their own account as principal, as agent for customers, as primary
distributors or jobbers as approved by the Bank of Canada or in any
other capacity and in respect of any debt, ﬁxed income or derivative
securities issued by any government in Canada or any Canadian institution,
corporation or other entity . . . .” (IDA 1998, 3).
afﬁliated companies, and incorporates standards and
procedures applicable to ﬁrms, criteria relating to
transactions with customers and with counterparties,
and rules of market conduct. The following para-
graphs offer a brief summary of the main provisions.
More complete information can be obtained by con-
sulting the ofﬁcial IDA document.
· Policies and procedures for member ﬁrms
Accordingtotheguidelines,memberﬁrms
should have written policies and
procedures relating to their operations in
the domestic debt market. These should be
approved by the board of directors and
should be made available for review by
the IDA. Members must ensure that all
their personnel are aware of the policies
and procedures, that they conduct their
trading activities in accordance with
them, and that all market dealings with
customers and counterparties are
confidential.
· Dealings with customers and
counterparties
The guidelines require that members
know their customers to ensure that their
recommendations are appropriate for their
customers’ investment objectives.
Members must avoid conﬂicts of interest
in their dealings with customers,
counterparties, and with the public.
· Market conduct
The code of conduct requires that
members observe high standards of ethics
and professional conduct. They must act
fairly, honestly, and in good faith in their
dealings, and their conduct must not be
detrimental to the public interest. They
must not engage in any manipulative
practices, nor act in any manner that
contravenes the Criminal Code or
applicable regulations, and they must
abstain from offering bribes or other
inducements to clients. Finally, members
should use clear and unambiguous
language in their dealings with their
customers and ensure that clients
understand the unique features of the
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should not abuse market procedures or
conventions, deliberately or otherwise, to
obtain an unfair advantage over, or
unfairly prejudice the interest of, their
counterparties or customers.
· Surveillance
Since the domestic debt market is an over-
the-counter market that is not generally
subject to the rules or disciplines of
organized markets or stock exchanges,
members are expected to monitor both
their own conduct and that of afﬁliates,
customers, and counterparties. It is the
responsibility of members to report
breaches of the policy promptly to the IDA
or to any other relevant authority,
including the Bank of Canada. The
association will also co-operate with other
authorities and regulatory agencies in
connection with the monitoring and
regulation of domestic debt markets.
Periodically, at the request of the Bank of
Canada or whenever there is concern that
the integrity of the market is in jeopardy,
the IDA will ask its members to report their
positions in Government of Canada
securities.
A wide range of sanctions may be applied against
members and their employees who breach the rules,
including ﬁnes, reprimands, suspension, or expulsion.
In addition, authorities such as the Bank of Canada,
the Department of Finance, or provincial securities
commissions may, at their discretion, impose formal
or informal sanctions. In the case of Government of
Canada securities, these include the suspension or
removal by the Bank of Canada of eligible bidder
status for auctions of such securities.
Changes to the treasury bill and bond
programs
The Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance
have also taken steps to lessen the effect of declining
government debt on the market and to maintain and
enhance the liquidity and efﬁciency of both the bond
and money markets. To this end, they have consulted
regularly with market participants on the structure of
the treasury bill and Government of Canada bond
programs.
A number of changes have been made as part of the
continuous and progressive restructuring of the bond
program. For example, in April 1997, 3-year bond
issues were discontinued because of the diminishing
size of the bond market. In April 1998, the frequency
of 30-year bond issues was reduced from quarterly to
semi-annually.
With respect to the treasury bill program, the issuing
cycle for 6-month bills was changed in July 1996. Since
then, initial issues of 6-month bills have been
reopened at the next regular treasury bill auction. This
measure is similar to the one introduced in 1993 for 1-
year treasury bills. In September 1997, after consulta-
tion with market participants, further revisions were
made to the issuing cycle for 3-, 6-, and 12-month trea-
sury bills. The weekly auction schedule was replaced
with a biweekly cycle, to allow higher amounts to be
auctioned at each session. In addition, maturity dates
were revised to make different issues fungible
(Department of Finance 1997and Boisvert and Harvey
1998).
In the spring of 1999, market participants were again
consulted, to assess the new treasury bill program and
to discuss the need for further changes. It was subse-
quently agreed that no further changes to the pro-
gram’s structure were needed for the time being
(Department of Finance 1999c).
Buyback operations for Government
of Canada marketable bonds
With the sharp reduction in government ﬁnancing
requirements, the size and structure of benchmark
bond auctions could not be maintained on the basis of
the government’s ﬁnancial position alone. The
reduced size of these issues, however, threatened to
signiﬁcantly affect market liquidity and integrity. As
the supply of securities declined in relation to
demand, there was a risk of an increasing concentra-
tion of securities held by a few participants and of a
negative impact on the liquidity of the secondary mar-
ket. It was therefore considered desirable to maintain
the size of benchmark issues as far as possible, despite
the reduction in marketable debt. One way to support
such issues is to repurchase issues of non-benchmark
bonds before they mature, with funding obtained
from benchmark issues.
In 1998, after consulting market participants and
releasing the first discussion paper, the Bank of
Canada launched a pilot program on behalf of the
federal government to buy back marketable Gov-
ernment of Canada securities (Gravelle 1998). This
program will continue during the 1999/2000 fiscal
year. This Canadian initiative comes in the wake of34 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
buyback programs in other countries, where they
have proven increasingly popular. Several countries
(the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Belgium,
New Zealand, and Italy) have implemented buy-
back programs for various reasons over the past 10
years. Other countries have established trade-up
programs that allow investors to exchange one or
two less-liquid bonds for a benchmark bond.
The Bank of Canada conducts buyback operations
on behalf of the government within a 7-day period
following a bond auction. Planned buybacks and the
targeted bonds are announced at the same time as the
amount of bonds to be auctioned. The maximum size
of the operation is also announced at that time. Gov-
ernment securities distributors are eligible to partici-
pate in the buyback program. Bonds in the current
benchmark issue and the two preceding benchmark
issues, as well as bonds in the CGB and CGF futures
deliverable baskets, are excluded from the pilot
project. Buyback transactions are settled on a cash
basis, and the repurchased bonds are subsequently
cancelled.
Since 1 December 1998, the Bank of Canada has
undertaken three buyback operations for Government
of Canada marketable bonds. It should be noted that
the Department of Finance reserves the right to accept
or reject any or all offers, in whole or in part. It also
reserves the right, without limitation, to accept less
than the maximum amount speciﬁed in the call for
tenders.
The ﬁrst and third operations related to 5-year bonds,
while the second was for 10-year bonds. In the case of
the ﬁrst operation, the buyback took place ﬁve days
after the auction of a benchmark bond with a maturity
comparable to that of the buyback bonds. In order to
reduce the risk of a change in the term structure of
interest rates, the second and third buyback opera-
tions were conducted on the day following the auction
of the benchmark bond.
Other measures to enhance market integrity
The Bank of Canada and the government also intend
to enhance market liquidity and efﬁciency by support-
ing private sector initiatives in the market for ﬁxed-
income securities. In particular, they have been work-
ing with the Montreal Stock Exchange and in ﬁnancial
circles to develop a futures market for government
debt. They have also helped to increase the transpar-
ency of market prices by assisting the Investment
Dealers Association and the Inter-Dealer Brokers
Association to establish an open screen-based infor-
mation system on prices and trades in the secondary
market for Government of Canada securities.
The Bank of Canada and the
government also intend to enhance
market liquidity and efﬁciency by
supporting private sector initiatives
in the market for ﬁxed-income
securities.
The Impact of Recent Initiatives
The initiatives taken by the Bank of Canada, the
Department of Finance, and the IDA appear to have
had a positive effect on the market for Government of
Canada securities. It is difﬁcult to quantify the impact,
however, because it is somewhat subjective and the
observation period is too short. Informal discussions
with market participants have, nonetheless, helped
identify certain effects.
The new auction rules seem to have helped restore
conﬁdence in the auction process for government
securities. Yet after such a short observation period,
we cannot use the usual measures of market liquidity
and efﬁciency to determine just what impact the new
auction rules have had on the primary market. For
example, while the coverage ratio for treasury bills has
risen slightly since October 1998, this improvement
might be related to certain seasonal or temporary
factors (Chart 4).
The bond buyback program has been well received by
the market, and participation to date suggests a fair
degree of interest. The changes in the treasury bill pro-
gram have also been welcomed, since they reﬂect con-
sultations held with all interested parties and the joint
work that went into them.
Conclusion
In the context of a swiftly evolving market and a sur-
plus in the federal government’s ﬁnances, the Bank of
Canada and the Department of Finance are continuing
their search for ways to maintain and enhance the efﬁ-
ciency of the market for Government of Canada
securities.35 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SUMMER 1999
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